The Euro 2002 Information Campaign, conducted by the Eurosystem (the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the euro area) made the introduction of the Euro notes and coins on the first day of 2002 a largely expected event of which nearly all people were fully aware. We can describe this as a natural experiment because the introduction of the new currency was exogenous. Most attempts to analyse the effect of nominal shocks on real variables are hampered by doubts about either endogeneity of the money supply or the precise expectations that agents had formed. But in this case neither of these doubts apply. Therefore it is an ideal event for testing the neutrality of money: if money is genuinely neutral the nominal shock should have had no effect on real variables.
Most discussion of the neutrality of money concentrates on the behaviour of consumers and producers and the consequent effects on prices. Of course there are several mechanisms by which money could be non-neutral. In the context of multiple equilibria, monetary shocks might allow firms to coordinate price changes to move to a high-price equilibrium, as suggested by Adriani, Marini, and Scaramozzino (2003) . Alternatively, some numbers appear to be more attractive as prices and we know
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that a disproportionate number of prices are round numbers (90% in the Netherlands according to Folkertsma, 2002) . A monetary shock that changed the magnitude of prices would then lead to changes in pricing behaviour. An example would be if V1 replaced 1000 Italian Lire as a favoured price, the so-called "one Euro" effect. Whether this is irrational, depends partly on context and whether the monetary medium makes using non-round numbers inconvenient: where coins are being used, sums of money are small or prices must be calculated mentally, rounding is a rational cost-reducing phenomenon: for example one might convert V1 to 2000 Italian Lire instead of 1936.27, a difference of only 3.2%. Conversely where transactions are large, are being conducted using electronic money or can be calculated on a computer, the use of round prices would be evidence of irrationality or bounded rationality. Sonnemans (2004) finds evidence of excessive proportions of round numbers on the Amsterdam stock market and consequent changes in behaviour when the Euro is introduced, which is strong evidence for irrationality.
Finally, there might be other forms of money illusion arising from the psychological effect of prices on behaviour.
An example of such behaviour is described by Raghubir and Srivastava (2002) , who suggest that consumers anchor their behaviour to a base set of nominal values. A simple example would be of an American consumer who goes to Canada where nominal prices are higher than in the U.S. (since a Canadian dollar is worth less than a U.S. dollar). Because of anchoring decisions to the base currency of the U.S. dollar, the consumer would confuse the higher nominal prices with higher real prices and underspend. In the immediate aftermath of the introduction of the Euro, we might expect European consumers to continue to perceive their income (hence their budget constraint) in terms of the former national currency. In every country except Eire the conversion to the Euro led to lower numbers, so the anchoring effect should result in greater spending, with lower spending only in Eire (Burgoyne et al. 1999) . Consistent with this, Jonas et al. (2002) find that Germans found salaries less attractive when paid in Euros and higher prices for consumer goods were estimated if these estimations were made in Euros compared to DM. Of course, we should expect this effect to be temporary as consumers adjust to the new currency. Soman, Wertenbroch, and Chattopadhyay (2002) suggest an alternative form of money illusion, which they refer to as difference assessment. They propose that money illusion could be explained by the numerosity of prices (Pelham et al. 1994 ). The argument is that consumers may evaluate transactions in line with the numerosity of the difference between budget and prices (an approximate measure of their purchasing power). This prediction does not contradict Raghubir and Srivastava's result when prices and budgets are quoted in different currencies. However, when they are both quoted in the same currency the numerosity effect is predicted to produce the opposite results of the anchoring effect. Soman et al. (2002) provide experimental evidence to show that if numerosity increases (i.e., all nominal values increase proportionately, including both the price of goods and the available money to be spent), then both total spending and spending patterns change: as the nominal values get larger, spending actually increases. If this effect is important, the introduction of the Euro should result in a fall in spending (except in Eire). By the same logic, smaller numbers would reduce the perceived relative prices of different goods (Marques 1999 ) so there might be changes in the composition of demand.
The empirical issue is then how to measure these effects in practice. Soman et al. (2002) and Raghubir and Srivastava (2002) , together with other papers such as Fehr and Tyran (2001) use laboratory experiments using students. Apart from questions of sample size, the concern with this methodology is that incentives are poor (students are often paid amounts such as $2 for participation) and there is little time for students to familiarise themselves with the problems they were set. So the subjects of the experiments may not take the test seriously and there may be strong framing effects, which is slightly ironic since the purpose of these studies is to test for the effects of money illusion (which is itself an example of a framing effect). Other studies such as that of Shafir et al. (1997) use surveys which may be the subject to mis-reporting, especially if respondents mis-remember their behaviour.
So while these papers are informative, the ideal solution would be to use a natural experiment observing people's actual behaviour and currency changeovers provide a perfect opportunity for such studies. Surprisingly, little research was done on decimalisation in the UK or the introduction of the New Franc in France and little has appeared on the Euro. A rare example is the paper by Kooreman, Faber, and Hofmans (2004) which shows that charitable giving increased by about 11% in the Netherlands after the introduction of the Euro. In our paper, we perform a similar analysis, but broaden the scope by considering a larger set of countries and also measure the dynamic effects of the changeover.
Our investigation is based on Sunday collections in churches in Ireland, Italy and some other European churches and we view the use of data on donations to allow us to conduct a precise test of money illusion. We know from the paper by Adriani et al. (2003) that prices of traded goods may change because the currency changeover provides a focal point for sellers to coordinate a move from a low-price equilibrium to a high-price equilibrium. In papers such as this and that of Kooreman et al. (2004) these effects are absent.
Although some economists might doubt the use of data on church giving, there is no reason to believe it less informative than information on other aspects of economic behaviour. Our data relate to a fairly large sample (in Eire, 23,000 church attendances) where agents are dealing with significant sums of money (in Eire, over V5 million per year). Since many church-goers value the church enough to devote considerable quantities of time to supporting church activities they are likely to take their financial giving seriously and the limited analysis on how agents choose their church giving has been summarised by Hoge (1994) who concludes that "religious giving is a rational behaviour and can be modelled using existing sociological and economic methods." So there is no reason to believe that agents' behaviour in this context will be any different from their behaviour concerning goods and services.
European churches were well aware of the financial risks posed by the introduction of the new currency and the issue was discussed in the press at the time.
1 For example, the typical contribution in the Roman Catholic Church in France was FFr 10 in the form of a single coin. If that contribution was to be replaced by the one Euro coin there would be a 35% drop in income, but if the contribution was a two Euro coin there would be an increase of a third. In the Church of Ireland, a proportion of income was received through bank standing order which would be unaffected by the currency changeover, but there were still concerns that the standard donation of £1 would be replaced by one Euro with a 20% fall in takings of cash (although in a straw poll taken in early January it appeared that giving had actually risen).
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Because of these potential problems, churches ran campaigns throughout 2001 to explain the currency changeover to their congregations in an attempt to ensure stability of income and it is likely that this reduced the effect of any money illusion. However, we have found that at least in some cases, there was a substantial real effect in 2002 and we now turn to our detailed results. In Section 1 we discuss the effect in Italian churches and in Section 2 the results from Irish churches and Anglican chaplaincies in Europe. Section 3 concludes.
THE ITALIAN DATA
From Italy we have a sample of 113 Roman Catholic churches from the Diocese of Verona: for each of these we have the total collection for the first 25 weeks of both 2001 and 2002. It is not customary to count the congregation in Roman Catholic churches and so we do not have information on congregation size. 3 We were able to exclude comparisons between weeks in the two years where one of the services might have been unrepresentative (e.g. because the service included a Baptism), although in practice this makes little difference.
Total giving for all of the churches is shown in Table 1 . We measure the increase in giving using change in the log of prices, ln (C 4 A formal counterfactual on how giving would have changed if the Euro had not been introduced, would require us to know the short-and long-run income elasticities of giving. However, with an increase in income and spending of only 3% these elasticities would have to be huge for an increase in giving of 11% to have been likely without a change in the Euro.
Having established that there was a significant increase in church giving at the time of the introduction of the Euro, we now refine this analysis to see how the yearon-year giving varied by week and by church. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the ratio of giving between 2001 and 2002 and the average giving over the two years for each of the 113 churches. It is clear that the increase in donations was about the same regardless of the amount of giving (itself presumably related to church size).
Alternatively we can see how the increase in church giving changed for different weeks of the year. Figure 2 graphs the mean ratio by week i, namely
where J is the set of non-special observations for week i and N J is the corresponding Fig. 1 . Total Giving and How Giving Changed 4. Growth in spending was the same as growth in income, which is prima facie evidence that the impact of the Euro on total spending was small. sample size: the average number of churches for which we have data per week is 109 and the lowest number is 101. Also plotted are the 95% confidence intervals based on the appropriate t-distribution. 5 We note that Palm Sunday and Easter fell in weeks 14 and 15 in 2001 and in weeks 12 and 13 in 2002: since attendance and giving would have been higher in these weeks, we should expect a relatively high ratio for weeks 12 and 13 and a relatively low ratio in weeks 14 and 15, and this is confirmed by the data. In addition, 6 January is the feast of Epiphany-a holy day of obligation and public holiday, which fell on the Saturday in 2001 and on the Sunday in 2002. The 2001 figure may include the collections for services on both the Saturday and the Sunday, so this observation may be biased down. Because first Sunday of 2002 was 6 January, the new coins had been in circulation for almost a week.
The temporal pattern of the increase in giving is interesting. For the first few weeks, the increase is negligible: in the first week giving appears to have fallen, probably due to the effect of Epiphany as just noted. Thereafter for mid-February to mid-March and from mid-April onwards, giving was always significantly higher than that in the corresponding week of the previous year. Although not obvious from the graph, overall giving in the Easter period increased in line with giving in the rest of the year.
5. The confidence intervals are for the mean ratio of giving by church. Thus, if church j had a ratio R j , then the graph plots the mean value N Ϫ1 Σ j R j and the confidence interval for the mean of those churchspecific ratios. Although this tells us little about the variance in the ratio of giving by persons, it is reported as the only measure of variance available. Although the new coinage was introduced on 1 January 2002, the Italian Lira continued to be legal tender until 28 February 2002 and it remained possible to exchange the old national currency after that date. Twenty three of the returns from Italy carefully separated the amounts donated in Lire and the amounts donated in Euros and we can use this sub-sample to measure the speed with which the new currency circulated in practice. The data are illustrated in Figure 3 . We can see that the majority of giving was in Euros only after week 3, so it is possible that the first few weeks in Figure 2 show little change in giving because there had been little change in the currency in use.
However, even when the new currency was in widespread use, many Italians may have continued to use the old currency as a unit of account: as late as 2003, most Italians claimed to think in Lire rather than Euros, with 39% always thinking in Euros and 30% often doing so (L'Osservatorio Findomestic, 10th Edition, 2003 Edition, -2004 ). With such a large number thinking in Lire, it would not be surprising that anchoring effects had a considerable effect.
Unlike Kooreman et al. we do not have data on the notes and coins used for donations, so we cannot comment directly on rounding, although we do know that if Italians had approximated the actual exchange rate of 1936.27 by 2000 then there would have been a reduction of 3.3%. But we do know that in 2001, 73% of collections were multiples of 1000 lire; while in 2002 only 47% of collections were multiples of 50 cents (42% multiples of V1), which is strongly suggestive that an increasing proportion of donations were not "round" numbers, although we cannot quantify the magnitude of this increase.
The marked increase in giving and the continued use of Lire as a unit of account provide strong evidence that anchoring was present in Italy and evidence against the phenomenon of difference assessment. But of all the countries that changed to the Euro, Italy was the one where the change in numerical values was largest and where it was correspondingly difficult to make any meaningful comparison between the two prices, so perhaps it is unsurprising that difference assessment was unimportant.
IRISH AND EUROPEAN CHURCHES
Our second set of data is from Anglican churches in Eire (the Republic of Ireland) and mainland Europe. 6 An advantage of this data is that Anglican churches count and record the congregation in every service. Since some of the variation in giving between 2002 and 2001 is likely to be due to variations in church attendance, having congregation figures will allow us to reduce the variance in giving.
Irish Churches
From Eire we have a sample of 77 churches from the Church of Ireland 7 and from the rest of Europe we have a sample of 29 chaplaincies from the Anglican Diocese in Europe. As a control sample we have also collected data from 23 churches from the Church of Ireland in Northern Ireland, where the currency is £ sterling and there was no change in coinage. For these churches we only asked for data for the first Sunday of each month from January to July. 8 As with the Italian data, services with a special event such as a Baptism are excluded.
Total giving and attendance figures are reported in Table 2 . There is considerable variation in both the amount of giving per capita and the year-on-year change between the five Irish dioceses. This is partly because income per head varies regionally: Dublin and parts of Meath are richer than the rest of Eire and giving per head is higher.
9 Some churches receive a substantial amount of regular giving through weekly giving schemes (often via bank standing order) so the plate collection is a relatively unimportant feature of giving. However, the increase in giving in churches where giving per head is relatively high (above V4) is 12.7%, which is in line with the complete set of churches for which the figure is 13.2% and we can find no other systematic relationship between giving per head and increases in giving.
6. Anglican chaplaincies in Europe exist mainly to serve expatriates and have services in English: formally they are part of the Church of England.
7. The Church of Ireland is the Anglican church which spreads across both Eire and Northern Ireland. Obviously the majority church in Eire is the Roman Catholic Church: at the 1991 census Church of Ireland members constituted 2.5% of the population in Eire.
8. These are weeks 1, 5, 9, 13, 18, 22 and 26 in 2001 and weeks 1, 5, 9, 14, 18, 22 and 27 in 2002 . Thus, the April and July observations are not the same week of the year. But the churches we sample tend to have a variety of services on a monthly basis, so the type of service on the first Sunday of the month (Holy Communion, family service, etc.) will always be the same and thus, comparable year-on-year. The weeks chosen do not include Palm Sunday or Easter Day; Anglican churches attach little importance to Epiphany so there would be no effect on the first observation of the year.
9. Unfortunately, regional GDP data for Eire are not available after 2001, so we cannot make comparisons on a region-by-region basis. Therefore we have a fairly robust result that giving increased by about 13% in Eire and about 11% in Northern Ireland. Although the figure for Eire is quite large, it is not out of line with GDP growth of 11% and could therefore be largely independent of the change in currency. Furthermore, Northern Ireland managed only a slightly smaller increase in giving despite having much lower GDP growth. Again we are hampered by not knowing the short and long-run elasticities of giving with respect to income, 10 but since an elasticity of one is not unreasonable, it looks as if giving in Eire was largely unaffected by the currency change. Of course, this may be a reflection on the success of the Church of Ireland's campaign to inform church members about the introduction of the Euro and to get church members to think about church giving more generally (a campaign on church giving was also conducted in the North at the same time). Figure 4 shows the ratio of giving on a monthly basis. There is no clear pattern in the increase in giving in either Eire or Northern Ireland, apart perhaps from a tendency to increase over time.
We also consider the proportion of collections which are round numbers. Here there is very little change in Eire: in 2001 32% of collections were a multiple of £1 and in 2002 33% were a multiple of V1. From this it is reasonable to infer that a high proportion of individual donations was multiples of the major currency unit and this proportion did not change much over time. However, £1 could be replaced by either V1 or V2, resulting in changes of -21% or ϩ57% or (if Irish 10. To calculate these we should need a time series of Church of Ireland giving and no such data exist (the Church does not collect aggregate figures).
11. Growth rates for the Euro countries compare current price GDP and Final Consumption Expenditure for the first and second halves of each year and are taken from Eurostat. The only data series available for Northern Ireland is Gross Value Added which compares the whole of 2001 with 2002 (this grew at the same rate GVA for the UK as a whole): the figure reported for Consumption growth in Northern Ireland is for the UK as a whole. church-goers adopted a variety of strategies) any number within this range: it is likely that the net effect of this was minimal. Similarly, if the exchange rate of £0.787 to the Euro were approximated by 0.8, then giving would only increase by 1.6%, which would clearly be difficult to identify.
Thus, the overall effect on giving in Eire is a fairly small increase, providing very weak support for Soman et al.'s hypothesis of difference assessment. However, to the extent that difference assessment is the explanation for the change in giving, we must assume either that its effect was very weak or that it was very largely offset by anchoring or the "one Euro" effect.
European Anglican Churches
For completeness, Table 2 also reports data on European churches. We conclude that giving per capita rose only in the Netherlands and fell in France, Germany, Belgium, and possibly Spain: compared to increases in income or consumption these qualitative conclusions are reinforced. Stronger conclusions are harder to draw given the smaller number of observations. Also, in some cases like Spain, they may be unrepresentative since they may include some chaplaincies whose congregations are predominantly tourists. Again there is evidence against anchoring, since giving fell in all cases except the Netherlands. Interestingly, we find an increase in the Netherlands of 12%, almost identical to the 11% increase recorded by Kooreman, Faber, and Hofmans (2004) .
Given the different sorts of nominal effect that could be present, a comparison between two countries with similar exchange rates is informative. Two similar rates Fig. 4 . Difference in Log Giving in Ireland are one German DM ϭ V1.95583 and one Dutch Guilder ϭ V2.20371 and the changes in these two countries are Ϫ23% and ϩ12%, respectively. Some of the change in giving could be due simply to rounding error: if people approximated these numbers with 2, then we should expect giving to have fallen by 2.3% in Germany and risen by 9.2% in the Netherlands, so the changes are larger than we could expect from rounding alone.
Belgium and France had substantially different exchange rates to the other countries, the rates being, respectively, 40.3399 BFR ϭ V1 and 6.55957 FFR ϭ V1. So for these two countries the numerical difference between salaries and prices in the original currency is not only much larger than in the new currency, but also the magnitude of the change is much larger than for any of the other countries. According to the theory of difference assessment, Belgium and France should thus have the largest fall in giving. There is certainly some weak evidence for this happening in France, where the fall is substantial and our estimates are based on large attendance figures, but much less so in Belgium.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis of church giving provides strong evidence for the non-neutrality of money in parts of Europe. This reinforces the analysis of Kooreman, Faber, and Hofmans (2004) and our estimates for the Netherlands are almost identical to theirs. However, the precise nature of the non-neutrality varies considerably. Nominal collections rose by 11% in Italy compared to a growth rate in income of about 3% and 13% in Eire compared to a growth rate in income of about 10%. On smaller data sets for the other Euro countries we find considerable variations in the increase in giving, but no consistent pattern. Soman et al. (2002) argue that changes in nominal values may affect behaviour through a process of "difference assessment," which would result in lower church giving in every country except Eire: this can be contrasted with the phenomenon of "anchoring" proposed by Raghubir and Srivastava (2002) , which would result in higher church giving in every country except Eire. The problem with both of these lines of research is that the evidence so far is based on laboratory experiments where there was no significant cash reward and where the reward provided little incentive to reveal correctly one's preferred behaviour. Furthermore, since it is likely that agents need some time to think through the consequences of changed nominal values, the time available in a brief laboratory experiment will typically be too short for them to fully assimilate the information.
Using a natural experiment we find higher church giving in both Italy and Eire. In the case of Italy, there is evidence in support of anchoring while difference assessment appears to have no role to play. But the actual change in the numerosity of the currency is far larger than the differences considered by Soman et al. (2002) and this may mean that agents were unaffected by difference assessment because comparison was impossible. For Eire, however, the overall effect is much smaller, with only weak evidence for difference assessment. In both countries the indirect evidence from the size of the total collection is that a high proportion of donations are round numbers, suggesting that the rounding effect may also have had an important effect in determining the overall effect of giving. Also interesting is the relatively large variation in responses of other European countries. To some extent this merely confirms our initial discussion of different possible effects (i.e., anchoring, difference assessment, rounding and threshold effects), each of which may be more or less important given the nature of the nominal shock. All of the hypothesised effects are types of bounded rationality and there is no reason that boundedly rational behaviour will respond in an entirely consistent manner to shocks of different types and magnitudes.
We conclude that there is strong evidence that nominal shocks will be non-neutral: a particular form of non-rationality causing this may be "difference assessment" and another one may be "anchoring." Depending on the exchange rate, one or the other may prevail. However, from our smaller sample of Anglican European chaplaincy giving data considerable variation remains in both the sign and magnitude of the effect. This is consistent with it being difficult in practice to find nonneutrality in long-run time-series data even if there appears to be non-neutrality in specific cases.
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